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Hundreds of European “foreign fighters” 
are still being held by Kurdish authorities, 
in Syria. Their fate remains uncertain, as 
European governments are unwilling to 
repatriate their citizens. Meanwhile, 
security and humanitarian conditions in 
the camps and detention facilities have 
significantly deteriorated over the past year, 
a trend further exacerbated by the 
COVID19 pandemic. This policy brief 
offers a summary of the main 
developments regarding Europeans 
detained in Syria, since the Turkish military 
offensive of October 2019. It offers a new 
compilation of figures for European adults 
and children detained, escaped or deported 
over the past year, before discussing the 
main policy options considered among 
European governments. 
 
On 9 October 2019, the Turkish armed forces 
launched a military offensive in Northern Syria, 
following a partial withdrawal of the US military 
forces in the region. The “Operation Peace 
Spring” intended to create a “buffer zone” 
between the Turkey-Syria border and the area 
controlled by the Kurdish autonomous 
administration. After days of clashes between the 
Turkish and Kurdish forces, a status quo settled 
in following mediation efforts by the US and 
Russia. 
 
(IN)SECURITY IN ISIS PRISONS 
Many governments, notably in Europe, were 
particularly concerned that the Turkish offensive 
would further destabilise the region and 
undermine the efforts of the global coalition 
against ISIS, and that it would potentially 
facilitate the resurgence of jihadi groups still 
active in Idlib province.1 Furthermore, European 
governments feared that the incursion could 
result in a massive jailbreak of thousands of ISIS 
fighters detained by Kurdish forces in the area.2 
 
These fears were quickly confirmed. About 750 
foreign ISIS-linked women and children were 
allowed to leave from the Kurdish camp of Ain 
Issa on 13 October, amidst reported shelling of 
the camp and riots against the guards.3 This group 
 
 





included a number of Europeans, notably: an 
Irish woman and her daughter,4 at least one 
British woman and her two children,5 at least nine 
French women and about 25 children,6 at least 
three Belgian women and their children,7 and at 
least one German woman and one Swedish 
woman with their respective children.8 Some of 
these families managed to return to their home 
countries in the following months, via Turkey, 
while others are still unaccounted for. 
 
Except for the Ain Issa incident, however, the 
worst-case scenario of massive escapes from the 
detention facilities located near the Turkish 
border did not materialise. Given the context, this 
is nearly a small miracle. Indeed, following the 
Turkish offensive, Kurdish forces had 
redeployed part of their guards and staff away 
from securing detention facilities to defend the 
Kurdish territory, while insecurity was 
simultaneously rising in the camps and prisons as 
a result of internal revolts. Furthermore, ISIS 
pledges to free jihadi detainees had already 
increased the pressure on the Kurdish 
authorities.9 Concern among European 
intelligence services was very high in October 
2019.  
 
If the worst could be avoided, the situation 
further deteriorated nonetheless. Over the past 
year, several mutinies have occurred in Kurdish 
detention facilities. For instance, on 29 March 
2020, ISIS detainees managed to take control of 
part of the al-Sinaa prison, in northeast Syria’s 
town of Hasakah, where 5,000 ISIS male fighters 
are held, including a number of Europeans.10 The 
riot was quelled within 24 hours, but more riots 
broke out in the same prison in early May, in June 
and twice in September 2020, as well as a number 
of jailbreaks attempted. 1 1 No European male 
fighter has reportedly escaped from Kurdish 
prisons, but according to a report from the global 
coalition against ISIS, the “the risk of a mass 
breakout cannot be discounted”.12   
 
Similarly, in camps for women and children, the 
security conditions have significantly 
deteriorated. This is notably the case in the 
infamous camp of al-Hol, where 65,000 women 
and children are being held,13 mostly Syrians and 
Iraqis – although that number will soon be 
drastically reduced as a result of the recent 
announcement by the Kurdish authorities that 
most of the 28,000 Syrian women and children in 
al-Hol would be released.14 Security conditions 
have particularly worsened in the “annex” of the 
camp, where 10,000 “foreigners” from around 60 
different nationalities are still being held.15 Cases 
of organised rebellion, violence among ISIS 
women and children, or power grab by extremist 
women trying to impose ISIS-style sharia law in 
the camp have been repeatedly reported.16 Similar 
incidents were already at play in 2019, but the 
situation clearly “became worse since the Turkish 
incursion”.17 
 
A number of escapes of ISIS women and children 
have been reported in al-Hol. According to the 
Kurdish forces, more than 700 attempted escapes 
were prevented between March 2019 and 
September 2020, noting that these attempts have 
increased since October 2019.18 This significant 
number of (attempted) getaways highlight the 
growing importance of financing and smuggling 
networks that allow these women to raise funding 
and get support for their exfiltration, whose cost 
is estimated between $10,000 and $35,000.19 A 
number of Europeans have managed to escape 
al-Hol under these conditions since October 
2019, including: at least 4 Finnish women with 
children,20 at least 10 Dutch women with 
children,21 at least 10 French women with 
children,22 about 6-10 Swedish women with 
children,23 at least 4 Belgian women with 
children,24 at least 2 German women with 
 
 





children, 25 and at least one British woman.26 This 
list is most likely incomplete, however, given the 
fuzzy situation on the ground and the fact that 
not even Kurdish forces or Western intelligence 
services seem to have a full picture. 
 
Next to the security conditions in the Kurdish 
camps and prisons, the humanitarian situation 
too has worsened. Hot summers and cold winters 
have continued to take a toll on a vulnerable 
population, suffering from malnutrition and poor 
sanitary conditions. In this context, some 
children have been reported deceased, including 
a few Europeans. Conditions were already dire 
before the Turkish offensive, but they further 
deteriorated, not least as a result of decreasing 
Kurdish staff available in the camps. In al-Hol, 
for instance, humanitarian access to the “annex” 
for foreign women and children has become 
extremely difficult, with a clear impact on that 
population in terms of medical support or 
schooling, notably.27 The COVID19 pandemic 
has only worsened the situation: in addition to the 
risk of infection within prisons and camps (only 
a few cases have been reported so far), the crisis 
has hampered the capacity of humanitarian actors 
to travel to the area and conduct their mission. 
There are also concerns that measures to prevent 
the spreading of COVID19, such as less physical 
contacts between guards and prisoners, might 
facilitate informal power grab by ISIS-linked 
groups and exacerbate a permissive environment 
for criminal activities in the camps, including 
those aiming at planning exfiltrations.28 
 
In total, according to our count, more than 53 
European women with an even higher number of 
children would have managed to vanish from the 
camps of al-Hol and Ain Issa since October 2019. 
The whereabouts of some of them are unknown. 
Most allegedly travelled to Idlib province, in 
northwest Syria.29 While some of them may have 
re-joined a jihadi group still active in that region, 
others have reached Turkey clandestinely, or 
Turkish-controlled territories in Syria, from 
where they could be deported to their countries 
of origin, particularly since Turkey’s Interior 
Minister declared in November 2019 that his 
country was “not a hotel for foreign terrorists” 
and pledged to accelerate the deportation of 
European foreign fighters.30   
 
Since October 2019, at least four European men 
as well as 73 women and children were deported 
back to their countries of citizenship by the 
Turkish authorities, but possibly more as there is 
no official figure available (Finland:1531, 
Germany:2032, UK:133, Netherlands:734, 
France:1335, Sweden:136, Denmark:137, 
Belgium:1938). Many of them were escapees from 
Ain Issa and al-Hol, but not all. Some had been 
unaccounted for until they managed to exfiltrate 
themselves into Turkey, whereas others had been 
in Turkish custody for some time already. Only 
in very exceptional circumstances have European 
governments proactively repatriated European 
citizens directly from Syria. These repatriations 
concerned almost exclusively (unaccompanied) 
children or children in very dire health 
conditions. Since October 2019, European 
governments have brought home 29 children 
from Syria, mostly from al-Hol (Finland:239, 
Germany:740, UK:441, Italy:442, France:1143, 
Denmark:144), whereas Germany and Italy both 
repatriated a mother along with their kids, which 
is highly exceptional given European 
governments’ reluctance to see ISIS members 
return (see below). Prior to the Turkish offensive, 
34 European children had already been 
repatriated in 2019 (Austria:245, Netherlands:246, 
France:1747, Sweden:748, Belgium:649), whereas 
Italy is the only European country to have 












In view of the deteriorating security and 
humanitarian conditions in the camps and 
detention facilities, Kurdish authorities have 
taken some measures in the past months. Isolated 
units were created to deal with COVID19 cases, 
for instance, whereas other measures were taken 
to improve general security in all facilities, 
notably plans to renovate existing infrastructure 
and building new facilities, with the financial 
support of the USA. The US government 
announced earlier this year that it had doubled 
the budget foreseen for detention facilities in 
Northern Syria ($20 million), in addition to the 
continued funding allocated for Kurdish guards. 
Additional funds ($2 million) were allocated in 
the aftermath of riots in Hasakah to reinforce 
security in detention facilities (e.g. install cameras, 
secure doors…).51  
 
The transfer of a number of foreign women and 
children, from the “annex” in al-Hol to the camp 
of al-Roj, is another decision aiming to improve 
security. A number of European citizens have 
been allegedly transferred since August. The 
camp of al-Roj is less populated and has better 
infrastructures, thus allowing a better control of 
detainees. Furthermore, this transfer operation 
was part of a broader effort of the Kurdish 
administration to improve its records on foreign 
ISIS members, through a screening process and 
the recording of biometric data in a database that 
can be used by foreign intelligence services.52 
Until now, the administrative records on ISIS 
members under Kurdish custody were largely 
incomplete (not accounting for dual nationality, 
e.g.), hence limiting the capacity to properly 
identify ISIS members, either in a perspective of 
repatriation or of intelligence-gathering. 
 
Another major development was the gradual 
release of Syrian ISIS members, started in spring 
2020 as part of an amnesty programme in 
cooperation with tribal leaders in Northern 
Syria.53 While most Syrian women and children 
are expected to be released from al-Hol, a 
number of male Syrian ISIS fighters that had 
been convicted by Kurdish courts saw their 
sentences halved. As a result of this initiative, 
Kurdish authorities intend to significantly lighten 
their humanitarian and security burden, while 
reinforcing their ties with the tribes that live in 
Northern Syria under Kurdish administration.  
 
EUROPEAN ISIS DETAINEES  
The number of European foreign fighters and 
families that remain under Kurdish custody in 
October 2020 is unclear. It is generally estimated 
that 13,500 “foreign” women and children (i.e. 
non-Syrians or Iraqis) are held by Kurdish forces 
in various camps, mainly in al-Hol, in addition to 
about 1,000 to 2,000 male foreign fighters 
detained in makeshift prisons, mainly in Hasakah. 
As mentioned above, the Kurdish authorities 
themselves were long unable to provide 
comprehensive figures based on nationalities, due 
to their limited administrative capacities (not 
recording dual citizenships, mistakes in 
recording, inability to verify the information 
given by individuals…), as well as the likelihood 
that a number of ISIS members lied about their 
nationality, for a whole series of possible reasons 
(e.g. unwillingness to be repatriated, no longer 
identifying with their homeland…).  
 
European governments are not always able to 
provide clear figures either, given their limited 
capacity to collect information themselves 
directly in the camps and prisons. They often 
have little more than estimates, based on the 
information provided by the Kurds and US 
intelligence services, as well as information 
collected from families and open sources or 
shared by international organisations active in the 
camps. Furthermore, most European 
governments have systematically avoided 
 
 





communicating any number on their nationals 
detained in Syria and Iraq, preferring to treat this 
sensitive matter with discretion.  
 
It should also be noted that the counting method 
differs from one country (or even administration, 
often) to another. It is not always clear whether 
figures available refer to national citizens only or 
to national “FTFs”, which include individuals 
who resided (legally or illegally) in the country but 
do not hold citizenship and would therefore likely 
not benefit from a repatriation programme. It is 
not always clear either whether figures include 
children or not, all adults or only women, those 
in Iraq or in Syria only. This means that official 
figures, when available, are not always 
comparable. It also creates a risk of double-
counting for individuals who resided in one 
country with the citizenship of another European 
country (e.g. a French citizen residing in Belgium 
would likely be listed in both French and Belgian 
FTF lists), and even more so for children born of 
two European parents with a different 
nationality. Adding to the difficulty, some FTFs 
have been stripped of their nationality, but it is 
never clear whether they remain part of the 
circulated figures, not least since such decisions 
Table: European foreign fighters and children detained in Syria and Iraq 
 
Notes: “+” indicates that the number refers to known individual cases, usually in the absence of an official estimate. 
It suggests more cases are possible. 
“~” indicates an approximate number, often reflected in a rounded figure or range, which can be an “official” 
estimate (as in the case of the Netherlands, provided by intelligence services) or “unofficial” estimate (as in the case 









are often being challenged in court and are thus 
pending. 
 
In the table above we have compiled the figures 
for the “most affected” European countries, 
which accounted together for more than 95 
percent of the European foreign fighters in Syria 
and Iraq. To collect these figures, we have 
contacted experts in each country with a short 
questionnaire, and we cross-checked their 
responses with open-source documents and press 
articles, as well as with officials from international 
NGOs active in the Kurdish camps. To the 
extent possible, we limited our figures to 
European “nationals” (thus with citizenship), 
thus eligible for repatriation. Indeed, most 
European countries monitor a large number of 
FTFs that have “links” with their homeland, but 
do not have a European citizenship (e.g. legal or 
illegal residents). While the figures above should 
be treated with caution, they offer the best EU-
wide estimate available to our knowledge. 
 
EUROPE’S POLICY OPTIONS  
One year after the Turkish offensive, in spite of 
the deteriorating security and humanitarian 
conditions in the camps and detention facilities, 
all European governments remain hostile to the 
repatriation of their nationals from Syria. They 
consider a policy of repatriation as “political 
suicide”, 65 and the issue has indeed triggered the 
fall of the government in Norway and political 
backlash against Finland’s pro-repatriation 
Foreign Minister.66 Although most governments 
emphasise the right of children to return, they 
have been mostly unwilling to repatriate the 
remaining 600+ children detained in Syria so far, 
except in the few cases mentioned above. In spite 
of some Court decisions (in Belgium, 
Netherlands or Germany, notably) demanding 
the repatriation of children,67 often along with 
their mothers, governments have categorically 
refused to repatriate adults – except on three 
occasions mentioned previously. Governments 
have usually argued that Kurdish authorities 
refuse to allow the repatriation of children 
without their mothers, hence leading to a 
deadlock. Meanwhile, in some countries, Court 
decisions have been overruled in Appeal, 
consolidating the governments’ position that 
there is no strict obligation to organise the 
repatriation of ISIS families. Some of these cases 
will still likely be taken to Supreme Court or to 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In quite a radical move, some countries have 
stripped some of their nationals in Syria of their 
citizenship, with the consequence of avoiding any 
obligation of repatriation, and with a potential 
impact on their children’s capacity to claim 
European citizenship (when born in Syria). The 
best-known case was that of Shamina Begum in 
the UK, whose citizenship was revoked in 2019, 
although the UK Court of Appeal eventually 
ruled in July 2020 that she should be allowed to 
return home in order to fully and effectively 
appeal against her citizenship deprivation.68    
Other countries that have stripped some of their 
fighters of citizenship include Belgium, France, 
Denmark and the Netherlands.  
 
If repatriation is excluded, at least for adults, the 
question remains as to what should be done with 
detained foreign fighters in Syria. Indeed, 
prolonged detention outside any legal framework 
(creating a sort of “European-sponsored 
Guantanamo”) cannot be considered an option. 
Most European governments have generally 
adopted the position that foreign fighters should 
be prosecuted “where they have committed their 
offences”, thus implying either in Syria or Iraq. 69   
The option of setting up an “international 
tribunal” was explored on several occasions since 
2018, notably pushed by Sweden and the 
Netherlands, but it has been largely recognised as 
impractical. It would be costly and lengthy to set 
 
 





up, most likely with only a limited ability to 
prosecute low-rank ISIS members. 
 
There are currently two main options that are 
being considered by the seven “most affected” 
countries (France, Germany, UK, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden). First, the 
option of trials in Iraq, by Iraqi courts, has long 
been favoured by the French government.70 As a 
sovereign country, with a functioning justice 
system, Iraq could possibly prosecute European 
fighters. In fact, more than 20 Europeans have 
already been convicted in Iraq. Several challenges 
stand in the way of generalizing such option, 
however. Leaving aside concerns about the ability 
of Iraqi courts to conduct fair trials or their ability 
to gather evidence against individuals whose 
crimes might have been limited to the Syrian 
jurisdiction, the transfer of European fighters 
from Syria to Iraq (since 95 percent of the 
European adults are currently detained in Syria) 
would be deemed illegal according to 
international law, and ethically problematic since 
Iraq still practices death penalty. 
 
Second, the option of trials in Syria by the 
Kurdish autonomous administration seems to be 
gathering increasing support from some 
governments, notably Sweden and the UK.71   
This option would fit better with the argument of 
“prosecution where the crimes were committed”. 
The problem is, however, that the Kurdish 
autonomous administration is not a recognised 
legal entity internationally, raising serious 
questions about its legal right to prosecute 
European fighters (and the status of such 
judiciary decisions) as well as its ability to conduct 
such trials. Furthermore, a European support to 
such initiative would inevitably be interpreted as 
a form of political support to the Kurdish 
administration, which could further complicate 
relations with Turkey and Syria. 
 
Either options have clear limitations, but they 
offer nonetheless viable alternatives to 
repatriation. They also have in common that 
European fighters would not only be judged in 
the region, but also detained there for years to 
come. This conveniently puts the issue off for 
governments in the short term, leaving it to their 
successors. However, it will not make the 
problem disappear. During their detention 
period, in Syria or Iraq, European fighters will 
continue to be at risk of further radicalisation and 
networking with other foreign ISIS inmates. It 
should be kept in mind that ISIS was partly a 
creation of the US clandestine prisons in Iraq 
(Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, notably). While 
many people beware of radicalisation in Europe’s 
prisons, it is hard to imagine a worse environment 
than prisons in Syria and Iraq, where some of the 
most dangerous terrorists in the world are packed 
together. Next, there is always the risk of prison 
breaks, which is unlikely to disappear in the 
unstable regional environment, with civil unrest 
and conflict ongoing, in addition to the risk of 
corruption or political instrumentalization of 
European prisoners. Again, it is hard to imagine 
a worse place in the world where Europe’s “most 
dangerous” individuals could be held.  
 
In line with their non-repatriation policy, and to 
address the aforementioned concerns, European 
governments are exploring the possibility to 
improve detention conditions and to strengthen 
“deradicalization” programmes in detention 
facilities. But it is hard to imagine how 
“deradicalization”, which is already deemed an 
extremely challenging endeavour based upon 
questionable assumptions in Europe, could 
succeed in such environment. As to the 
improvement of detention conditions, it is 
certainly needed, but it will not fundamentally 
address all the security concerns mentioned 
above. Finally, it is also important to remind that 
many European fighters will likely be sentenced 
 
 





to several years of prison, perhaps 5-10 years, 
thus not necessarily more than what they would 
get in Europe. As a result, it needs to be well 
understood that non-repatriation does not imply 
that these individuals will never be released or 
able to return to Europe. The only question we 
should ask ourselves then is whether we are 
willing to abandon any form of control on 
European foreign fighters, at the risk to see them 
come back in some years even more radicalised, 
or if we’d rather “take back control” as it is 
popular to say these days, to ensure the proper 
prosecution, detention and rehabilitation of 
foreign fighters in Europe. 
 
Repatriation appears to us as the most sensible 
option, for security, legal and ethical reasons. A 
growing number of voices have publicly called 
for the repatriation of all European children and 
their mothers, and even of ISIS fighters. Since 
last year, some of these calls were unsurprisingly 
made by family members of individuals stranded 
in the region, or by child protection agencies. In 
some cases, notably in France and Belgium, these 
calls were joined by some victims of terrorism. 
Some key counter-terrorism practitioners have 
also argued publicly in favour of the repatriation 
of ISIS fighters and their families, such as French 
anti-terrorist magistrate David De Pas,73 the 
Federal Prosecutor Frédéric Van Leeuw and the 
former Head of the counter-terrorism fusion 
centre (CUTA) Paul Van Tigchelt in Belgium,74 
or the former MI6 Counterterrorism Director 
Richard Barrett in the UK.75 Some politicians 
have also publicly called for the repatriation of 
children with their mothers, notably a group of 
76 Parliamentarians and Senators in France,76    
and a group of senior conservative MPs in the 
UK.77     
 
The repatriation of children should never have 
been an issue. They are victims and protected 
under international law. The majority of them are 
below 5 years old, and they have every chance to 
fully resocialise in their home countries as the 
experience of previous repatriations demonstrate. 
In contrast, the more time they spend in the 
camps, the more traumatized they become, and 
the more difficult their resocialisation will be. As 
we argued more than two years ago, children are 
not “ticking time bombs”, but they could become 
ones if we do not bring them back. 78 Moreover, 
children should be repatriated with their mothers, 
to avoid the traumatic separation of a child from 
his mother. The reported attempts of some 
governments to repatriate children without their 
mothers is morally reprehensible, and practically 
counter-productive. Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that many women are considered to 
be “deradicalized”, “disengaged” or “not a 
threat” by European intelligence services, and 
their repatriation should therefore not be a major 
concern. 79 Some other women are considered a 
threat, but they could be properly prosecuted and 
detained in Europe, certainly in much more 
secure conditions than they would be in Syria or 
Iraq. Finally, it is arguably also safer to repatriate 
male fighters, as argued by the key counter-
terrorism practitioners mentioned above. Many 
foreign fighters have already been convicted in 
absentia, and could even be prosecuted for more 
serious crimes (such as crimes against humanity) 
if European governments decided to prioritise 
this approach. European penitentiary 
administrations are now well experienced in 
managing terrorist offenders, as they have 
handled thousands of them over the past years, 
so they could very much deal with a few more 
returnees. The capacity and the expertise is there; 
it is the political will that is missing. 
 
This said, it should be recognised that whereas 
some countries have been particularly successful 
at prosecuting returning foreign fighters, such as 
France or Belgium, other countries have been 
almost unable to bring charges against them, like 
 
 





Sweden or the UK notably. Furthermore, some 
countries have still not prosecuted women yet, 
such as Finland, whereas other countries are now 
systematically prosecuting returning women. This 
discrepancy among European approaches to 
returnees could possibly impact the position of 
respective governments, and it will possibly lead 
to different responses across Europe. As a matter 
of fact, it is very much possible to envisage a 
combination of options for the whole population 
of ISIS detainees (local trials vs. repatriation), 
with a different equilibrium in each country. It is 
also possible to envisage a multi-step scenario, 
starting with the repatriation of the most 
vulnerable, notably the children, and leaving open 
the option of more repatriations at a later stage. 
As governments reflect on their options, 
however, they would be well advised to ponder 
the cost of their inaction against the words of this 
Danish grandfather in November 2019, after the 
repatriation of his grandson: “The Danish 
government has immensely helped us trace and 
bring him over,” he said. “I’m in debt to the 
Danish government”, he concluded. 80    
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